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A new theory of time
Abstract This article proposes an interpretation of time that incorporates both McTaggart's A-series
and his B-series, and tries to cast it in a role that could be useful to physicists. This AB-series allows
one, to reconcile special relativity with temporal becoming if the latter is understood as 'ontologically
private', which is given a mathematical definition. This allows one to define a unit of becoming, as well
as the rates of becoming. This article gives a picture of this interpretation. 
1 AB-series time 
Famously, McTaggart (McTaggart, 1908) identified two different series that characterize time. 
There is the B-series and the A-series.
“Positions in time, as time appears to us prima facie, are distinguished in 
two ways. Each position is Earlier than some, and Later than some, of the other 
positions. And each position is either Past, Present, or Future. The distinctions of 
the former class are permanent, while those of the latter are not. If M is ever earlier 
than N, it is always earlier. But an event, which is now present, was future and will 
be past.” 
 
I won't follow McTaggart to the conclusion that time is unreal, but suggest that time is real and 
has both B-series and A-series characteristics.
The B-series is a series of times ordered by the relation of 'earlier-than' (or 'later-than'). The B-
series is usually thought of as going from earlier times to later times. It could be argued the B-series is 
the kind of time that's most often used in physics. For example, both coordinate time and proper time 
are B-series. And the time parameter of the Schrodinger equation is a B-series. The B-series relations 
do not change. Also, going 'backward in time' in the B-series just means going to earlier times.
I would argue the A-series is also a part of a comprehensive view of time. It's inescapable that 
dinner tonight is first in my future, then in my present, and then in my past. In contrast to the B-series, 
the A-series values change. Also in contrast to the B-series, going 'backward in time' is undefined, on 
this view. 
It's a Zen observation that “Time constantly goes from past to present and from present to 
future. This is true, but it is also true that time goes from future to present and from present to past.” 
(Suzuki 1986), p. 33. The former is the B-series (interpreted as 'earlier-times to later-times') and the 
latter is the A-series. Instead of saying 'time goes from past to present to future', we'd say 'time goes 
from earlier times to later times as it goes from future to present to past'. As later and later times 
become present, time appears to go on.
The question is how to incorporate the A-series in physics, while of course retaining the B-
series, into what might be called the AB-series. The ideas here are somewhat related to Tense Realism, 
Perspectival Realism, and Fragmentalism, (Hare 2010), (Fine 2005). The idea will be to add to each 
system a 'now' and a 'becoming' (of the A-series) that is ontologically private to that system, while 
retaining the ontologically public B-series interrelations already in wide use in physics.
2 Ontological privacy  
An ontologically private parameter may be defined as one that takes on a definite value when a 
system S specifies its own ontic state, but does not take on a definite value when a different system 
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specifies S's ontic state. This could be because, for the other system, 1. there is no such parameter, 2. 
there is a parameter but is doesn't have a definite value, 3. there is a parameter and it has a definite 
value but it is not known or knowable, for some reason, as might be useful in Qbism.
 
3 Panpsychism  
I am conscious, and this is certain to a degree even greater than the certainty that there are 
physical laws on salient interpertations. But there is in one sense nothing special about my composition
—I'm made of electrons and quarks etc. Thus there is good reason to think that the basic elements that 
make up my brain are accompanied by the basic elements of subjective experience—qualia. One is lead
to the hypothesis that an electron is accompanied by a quale—a subjective experience—for example, 
the color green. Perhaps a muon is accompanied by a blue quale. There's been an amount written about 
this and surrounding ideas but the basic idea is clear enough and is called (dualist) Panpsychism. 
(Stanford 2017). (Other correlates to qualia such as complexity could be entertained.)
A quale may be construed, on most readings, as an ontologically private thing. For example, I 
may experience what I know as 'green' when I look at the leaves of a tree. But I cannot know that you 
experience the same quale (i.e. what I would call green) when you look at the same leaves. This 
observation shows my quale has a definite value for me, but not for you, and vice versa.   
 Some notion of temporal becoming is often supposed to be a feature of the A-series view. 
Becoming, for the purposes of this paper, is that flow by which an indexical clock (defined below) is 
first future, then now, and then past. Becoming is sometimes understood phenomenally. (Loury 2016). 
If panpsychism is true and temporal becoming is phenomenal then arguably every system experiences 
becoming. e (defined below) is well-defined in the sense that an interval of 1 second of B-series clock 
time is defined for a protozoan just as well as it is defined for a human, e.g. Alice, even though the 
protozoan doesn't have the mental resources of Alice. It's plausible that it's the same way with 1 e of A-
series becoming.
4 New symbol, indexical clocks, the unit of becoming, rates of becoming
Mathematicians were taking square roots of positive numbers, e.g. finding x in the equation x2 =
1. But one wanted to generalize to equations like x2 = -1. There was no real number that did it, so to a 
real number Cardano added a non-real parameter i. That is, i is a kind of standardized place-holder for a
would-be root, whatever the correct definition would eventually turn out to be. 
So, one thing to try is: to a parameter  t whose unit is a change in indexical clock time, for
example, a second, add a parameter e whose unit is not an interval in B-series clock time. In AB-theory
e would  be  of  the  A-series,  a  unit  of  what  temporal  becoming  is  like  per  second,  as  a  kind  of
standardized place holder.
Define an indexical clock to be a clock that's not accelerating, has relative velocity 0, and is spatially 
local, to a centered inertial reference frame.
Try the definition 
1 e is what temporal becoming is like for 1 second of indexical clock time 
If becoming is indeed phenomenal, then it must be defined ('referred to') in this curious 'what it 
is like' way. This is how qualia must be defined, on salient views. E.g. a green quale is defined as 'what 
it is like' to experience green. The necessity of doing this has to do with their ineffability. e can be well-
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defined across systems. 1 second is well-defined across systems such as Alice and a protozoan, even 
though the protozoan doesn't have the mental capacities Alice does. It's plausible that it's the same way 
with 1 e of A-series time.
For imaginary i we have i4 = 1. What is the relation between es and seconds? If the fourth power
of one were to give you the other then it could be argued the complex numbers model time in AB-
theory.
Define
 
1 sec./e = d(Alice's B-series)/d(Alice's A-series)
is the change in 1 second of indexical clock time per change in e.
Consider the rate r = 2 sec./e. This can be interpreted as meaning there are 2 seconds of indexical clock 
time per unit of becoming. Presumably, the 2 seconds are in a series. That would seem to imply that, for
1 e, 2 seconds go by, so earlier-to-later relations would appear to go by faster.
Let the rate r be in units of sec./e. The general idea is this:
r > 1 B-series time appears sped up (earlier-times to later-times appear to be going by faster than 
normal)
r = 1 the change in B-series information per change in A-series information is given by 1 second of 
indexical clock time per unit e of becoming. This is assumed to be invariant across all 
panpsychist systems, the way 1 second of indexical clock time is invariant across such systems 
as Alice and a protozoan.  
0 < r < 1    B-series time appears slowed down (as in relativistic dilation) 
r = 0 B-series time appears stopped (but the appearance goes on)
r < 0 one appears (from future to now to past) to be going backward in B-series time
One may define dr/de. e2 would have something to do with the rate of becoming accelerating. e-2 would
be something like “per unit of becoming, per unit of becoming”.  
5 Special Relativity 
Four coordinates (t, x) are not enough to schedule a meeting between Alice and Bob. Alice must
also know if the meeting is to take place in her past or in her future. If it's supposed to take place in her 
past, she may have already missed it, and should act accordingly. If it's in her future, she may be able to
make it, and can act accordingly. Alice can make a prediction about whether she'll make the meeting 
based on future-now-past information. So it's falsifiable.
I conclude Alice doesn't live in Minkowski space, but a larger space. Minkowski space doesn't 
have enough information to schedule a meeting. One needs something like (gj, t , x) coordinates for 
systems j. 
As of this writing, Google have two temporal parameters by which one may filter a search for 
videos. There's 'Duration', the end of the video supposed to be that much later than the beginning. And 
there's 'Time', which might be, for example, one year before now. Similarly, YouTube has 'Duration' and
'This year', one year before now. There are two buttons. The thing is, how would you keep the same 
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functionality with only one button? This might be interpreted as a kind of experimental result: at least 
two buttons are needed for the temporal parameters. I don't see a way out for either the A-theorist or the
B-theorist.  
Alice orbits the earth and Bob is in the Andromeda galaxy. For some configurations, the planes 
of simultaneity of Alice change so that Bob is in Alice's B-series later than, simultaneous with, earlier 
than, simultaneous with, later than, etc... 
“But (bringing the subject into the story) my now advances along my trajectory at
one second of my personal experience for each second that passes on my watch, which follows the 
same trajectory as I do. And your now advances along your trajectory at one second of your personal 
experience for each second that passes on your watch, which follows the same trajectory as you do.” 
Mermin, (2018), p. 33. We might be able to say Alice's now advances along her worldline in an 
ontologically private way at a rate of one second of personal experience for each second that passes on 
her watch. Also, Bob's now advances along his worldline in an ontologically private way at a rate of 
one second of personal experience for each second that passes on his watch. But, for Bob, it is not true 
that his now varies back and forth through his clock times, as Alice would have it.
The now is an empirical feature. Alice and Bob may agree on the order of all of their watch's 
ticks along each person's worldline—this is the B-series information. This information is effable. Yet 
Alice and Bob, in this view, may experience their own senses of now—the A-series information.
Simultaneity. I assume an explanation would go something like this. Alice, at rest relative to the 
train station, experiences one e of what her temporal becoming is like per second of her indexical clock
time. Bob experiences one of his e of what his temporal becoming is like per second of his indexical 
clock time, who is at rest relative to the train, which is speeding by the train station. … As Bob goes by,
Alice has it that his clock runs slower than hers, and vice versa. On one of the interpretations of 
'ontologically private' these are all consistent because, for Alice, Bob's e has no particular value, and for
Bob, Alice's e has no particular value. On another interpretation, for Alice, Bob doesn't even have a 
parameter e, and vice versa.
Are we allowed to just stipulate that? If becoming is phenomenal and ubiquituous then yes, yes,
we can just stipulate that. That's because it's like the case where I can see green when I look at a patch 
of leaves but I don't know that you experience the same qualia (those which I would call 'green'), when 
you look at those leaves. When you look at those leaves you might be experiencing what I would call 
red, or even experiencing nothing at all. In some ontological sense I can't assign a definite (qualitative) 
value to what you see. So this is an example where phenomenology fits either of two of the above 
definitions of ontologically private. 
6 Picture of AB-series time
One doesn't need to suppose the present is a single infinitesimally small point centered at, for example, 
t = 0. For each t there could be a degree of 'existence' or 'actuality' or 'presentness' d = d(t), so the now 
is spread out in B-series time somewhat. (Smith, 2010). One attractive example is for d some Gaussian 
function of t (in a centered world). Also non-symmetric functions.
A schematic of the AB-series picture of time would go something like
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The earlier-time to later-time time-like worldline of a pendulum stays in one ordering (of one kind or 
another), but the whole worldline moves from future to present to past, with the present staying put. As 
later and later B-series times become present, time appears to go on.
Time-reversal goes like
t_3 and then an earlier time t_2 and then an even earlier time t_1 become from Alice's future to her 
present and then to her past. As earlier and earlier times become present her, time appears to be going 
in reverse. Time-reversal invariance obtains only for a B-series, on this view. Time-reversal for an A-
series is undefined. There's no unit defined of going backward in the A-series.
Two pictures
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      picture 1              picture 2
where t_3 is later than t_2, which is later than t_1. There are two parameters for one dimension of time.
Minkowski space doesn't distinguish between picture 1 and picture 2. Ergo, Alice doesn't live in 
Minkowski space, but a larger space.
Minkowski space doesn't have enough information to schedule a meeting. One needs something
like (gi, t , x) coordinates for systems j. One may define functions of these coordinates kj = k(gj, t , x). 
The point is now that there are no functions of more than one system's private variables gj, ej, because 
these are ontologically private, by hypothesis. 
One can chain derivatives if there's only one ej. For example
(Alice's A-series) (Alice's B-series) (Alice's A-series)
(Alice's B-series) (Bob 's B-series) (Bob 's B-series)
d d d
d d d
=
A function of a public parameter is public. A function of a private parameter is private to that 
system. A function of two public parameters is public. A function of a public and a private parameter is 
private to that system. There are no functions of private parameters of two different systems.  
7 Seconds, position, experiment  
The definition of a second is
 
“The second is the duration of 9 192 631 770 periods of the radiation 
corresponding to the transition between the two hyperfine levels of the 
ground state of the cesium 133 atom.” https://physics.nist.gov/cuu/Units/second.html
One might say this duration (...) is an interval. It's irrelevant to this definition when now actually
is. To actually do the experiment one cannot avoid the relevant A-series information (i.e. at some time 
it must come to pass that the physicist performs the experiment in his or her present). So, to make an 
accurate model of actually doing the experiment, the physicist must add A-series information to their 
model. How many bits does it take to specify the A-series information?   
.
The thing to do for the simple case of the point position of a classical particle is along this line. 
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For classical 3-dimensional position x, one has x as a function of seconds, x = x(b seconds). (I'll use 'b' 
instead of 't' for the number of seconds for reasons to become clear.) Let g be position of the particle on
the future-now-past spectrum such that g > 0 means the particle is in Alice's future, g = 0 the middle of 
the present, and g < 0 past. The coordinate is standardized by the unit of becoming ei. For the AB-series
one has x = x(a gi, b seconds). The first coordinate carries the information a of how far in the 
future/now/past the particle is, for Alice. The possible world at a can be assigned a degree of 
existence/actuality/presentness d(a). The growing-block theorist supposes the past is real, which might 
be defined as d(a) = 1 for a < 0. The block theorist would have d(a) = 1 for all a. The presentist has d(a)
= 1 for a = 0. This is generalized by the 'presentism function' d(a).
Notes
Time, in the sense that both the A-series and the B-series are needed, in turn, suggests that the dualist's 
qualia and matter are parameterized by two different variables, and they're probably not isomorphic.
…
There's a difference between e the unit of becoming, and g the location along the future/now/past 
spectrum, and t the interval of a second. Is there some relation between them, like e * g = - t ?
…
It's not right to say time goes from 'past to present to future' in this AB-interpretation. Rather it goes 
from earlier times to later times, as it goes from future to present to past. As later and later times 
become present, 'time  to goes on'. 
...    
A good candidate for being the most fundamental equation in all of physics is distance = rate * time, d 
= r * t. The time variable t is a B-series. Is the time variable in the rate also necessarily a B-series? If 
it's an A-series, this would change the interpretation of 'distance' to 'actual distance'.
... 
One says, for example, let's meet at height meters, latitude 100, longitude 100, at the time t = January 
1st, 2029. What this time really says is to meet at a time that is 2029 years later than year 0. The time 
coordinate doesn't have the future/present/past temporal information. This is witnessed by the necessity
of having at least two buttons for the temporal parameters of videos on Google or YouTube. 
…
There's a large and growing body of proposals for what the correlates ('correlates' given dualism) of the
phenomenal are. If the phenomenal are correlated to something, for example, complexity, and there are 
relative amounts given by that complexity, then it may be that this would affect the 'amount' of seconds 
per e, a seconds/b es. That would then have the interpretation that the complexity of a system is 
correlated to the rate of becoming (i.e. the number of Bob's indexical clock seconds that go by per e of 
Alice).
...
Why not consider the entangled singlet state F  defined by 
1 101 10
2 2
F = -
for two anti-correlated spins of electrons e1 and e2. Suppose Alice and Bob are space-like separated 
and e1 goes to Alice and e2 goes to Bob. When Alice measures the spin of her electron, is the spin of 
Bob's electron determined instantaneously or not? On the one hand, no. Nothing can go faster than 
light, and the electrons are space-like separated. On the other hand, yes. The present in which Alice 
measures e1 is the same present in which she instantly knows (infers) the spin value of e2. In the latter 
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case her future can't contain any states where the value for e2 is different than what Bob gets for e2.
In classical physics the position of a system is sometimes given as a function of time, x = x(t). 
This time variable is a B-series. To incorporate A-series information one apparently introduces 
ontologically private time parameters gj for each system j, indicating where on j's future/present/past 
spectrum the particle is. This makes the physics relative to the present of the observer. xj = xj(gj, t). For 
example the position of e1 relative to Alice might be location (1, 2, 3), when the indexical clock says 4 
pm and when e1 is 3 seconds in the future of Alice. (In 3 seconds the clock will come into Alice's 
present and it will read 4 pm.) 
If we equate the private parameters between e1 and e2, gi = gj, this has the interpretation that we 
are in the special case where Alice and Bob have the same present. In that case, Alice's inference of 
what e2 is, and the measurement of e2 by Bob, are simultaneous and in the same present. In this case 
the measurement by Alice of e1 does the job of the two measurements of e1 and e2. 
Since Alice makes one measurement that is effectively two measurements, instead of Alice 
getting a result to her measurement '0' or '1' plus epistemic information as in the usual case, her one 
measurement reveals the whole system, with result '00' or '11', as the combined state hasn't been 
determined by Alice or Bob, or anything, until then. So in this case Alice doesn't measure '0' or '1' (plus 
epistemic information), which are 50% anti-correlated. In the special case, she measures '01' or '10', 
and these are 100% anti-correlated. By varying these two kinds of measurement one can get any 
probability in between. I think it could be argued that the measurement in this special case, represented 
by one operator (I think) on a Hilbert space, has ontological significance for e1 and e2. This is a non-
local condition. Therefore this interpretation might produce greater-than-local correlations. 
8 Conclusion
“well, [time] is a bit of a mystery. I'd say we understand about half of it, and 
the other half is still yet to be explained.”  (Carroll, 2010)
The definitions of the B-series and A-series have teeth—B-series values (orderings of whatever 
kind) don't change on time-like worldlines, while A-series values do change. The B-series is 
ontologically public while the A-series is ontologically private, which has been given a mathematical 
definition and which allows it to be consistent with the relativity of simultaneity. If the AB-series view 
of this paper can be sustained, the A-series would be the other half Carroll referred to. In this 
interpretation of time there is one dimension of time per system (however 'system' is to be defined), and
it has both A-series and B-series characteristics.  
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